Bad Faith in Cyberspace:  Grounding Domain Name Theory in Trademark, Property, and Restitution by Lipton, Jacqueline D
The University of Akron
IdeaExchange@UAkron
Akron Law Publications The School of Law
September 2014
Bad Faith in Cyberspace: Grounding Domain
Name Theory in Trademark, Property, and
Restitution
Jacqueline D. Lipton
Case Western Reserve University School of Law, jdl14@case.edu
Please take a moment to share how this work helps you through this survey. Your feedback will be
important as we plan further development of our repository.
Follow this and additional works at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/ua_law_publications
Part of the Law Commons
This is brought to you for free and open access by The School of Law at IdeaExchange@UAkron, the institutional
repository of The University of Akron in Akron, Ohio, USA. It has been accepted for inclusion in Akron Law
Publications by an authorized administrator of IdeaExchange@UAkron. For more information, please contact
mjon@uakron.edu, uapress@uakron.edu.
Recommended Citation
Lipton, Jacqueline D., "Bad Faith in Cyberspace: Grounding Domain Name Theory in Trademark, Property, and
Restitution" (2014). Akron Law Publications. 139.
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/ua_law_publications/139
Bad Faith in Cyberspace:  Grounding Domain Name Theory in  
Trademark, Property and Restitution 
 
Jacqueline D. Lipton* 
 
Abstract 
 
The year 2009 marks the tenth anniversary of domain name regulation under the 
Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA) and the Uniform Domain 
Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP).  Adopted to combat cybersquatting, 
these rules left a confused picture of domain name theory in their wake.  Early 
cybersquatters registered Internet domain names corresponding with other’s 
trademarks to sell them for a profit.  However, this practice was quickly and 
easily contained.  New practices arose in domain name markets, not initially 
contemplated by the drafters of the ACPA and the UDRP.  One example is 
clickfarming – using domain names to generate revenues from click-on 
advertisements.  To avoid trademark liability, most clickfarmers and 
cybersquatters utilize personal names, geographic and cultural indicators, and 
generic terms as domain names.  The application of current regulations to these 
practices is unclear, largely because of the lack of a coherent policy basis for 
domain name regulation.  This article develops a new model for domain name 
regulation.  It incorporates trademark policy within a broader theoretical 
framework incorporating aspects of restitution and property theory.  The author 
suggests that a broader theoretical approach to domain name regulation would 
facilitate the development of more coherent domain name rules in the future.  
This discussion is particularly timely in light of the forthcoming implementation 
of a new generic Top Level Domain (gTLD) application process. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Think back, if you can, to the early days of the new frontier - not the Western 
frontier, but the virtual frontier.  Like the Western frontier, the early Internet was largely 
barren space awaiting cultivation.  Virtual prospectors never knew if they would strike it 
rich or die trying.  However, some clever prospectors managed to secure something that 
their real world counterparts never imagined possible – a guarantee of striking gold if 
they moved fast.  Enter the cybersquatter… 
 
In the early to mid 1990s, a handful of tech-savvy virtual prospectors realized the 
value of trademarks in the domain space long before many mark-holders did.  These 
prospectors registered multiple domain names corresponding with trademarks very 
inexpensively.1  They offered to sell them back to the trademark holders for a handsome 
profit.2  Today, this practice is old news, and infrequent in practice.  Quick to react to the 
cyberquatting threat, judges held early cybersquatters liable for trademark infringement 
and dilution.3  The United States Congress son followed with the Anti-Cybersquatting 
Consumer Protection Act (ACPA),4 while the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names 
and Numbers (ICANN)5 adopted the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy 
(UDRP).6  These measures more than met the challenges posed by cybersquatting.   
 
However, the application of these rules left a confused pastiche of domain name 
policy in their wake.  As the rules were narrowly targeted to protect trademarks against 
                                                 
1
  See, for example, http://www.toeppen.com/, last viewed on August 10, 2009 (describing the early 
cybersquatting of famous cybersquatter, Dennis Toeppen); Cybersquatters:  Invading Big Names’ 
Domains, CNN.com Technology, September 25, 2000, available at 
http://archives.cnn.com/2000/TECH/computing/09/06/internet.domains/index.html, last viewed on August 
10, 2009. 
2
  DAVID KESMODEL, THE DOMAIN GAME:  HOW PEOPLE GET RICH FROM INTERNET DOMAIN 
NAMES, 20 (2008) (“Hundreds of early speculators registered domains associated with trademarks – names 
or symbols used to identify a company’s goods and to distinguish them from those sold by others.  The 
classic tactic was to register a domain, do nothing with it (create no Web site), wait to hear from the 
trademark holder, and then offer to sell it for a high privce.  This practice came to be known as 
cybersquatting.”) 
3
  Panavision v Toeppen, 141 F 3d 1316 (9th Cir, 1998) (cybersquatter liable for trademark dilution); 
Planned Parenthood Federation of America v Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q. 1430 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (infringement and 
dilution liability of registrant found, although this is not a typical cybersquatting case because there was no 
sale motive on the part of the registrant). 
4
  15 U.S.C. § 1125(d). 
5
  MILTON MUELLER, RULING THE ROOT:  INTERNET GOVERNANCE AND THE TAMING OF 
CYBERSPACE, 3 (2004) (describing the development of ICANN as the body to administer the domain name 
system); Christine Haight Farley, Convergence and Incongruence:  Trademark Law and ICANN’s 
Introduction of New Generic Top-Level Domains, 25 JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW 625, 
626 (2008) (“The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers or ICANN, is the body that 
governs the Internet’s infrastructure.”); see also www.icann.org, last viewed on August 10, 2009. 
6
  Full text of the policy available at:  http://www.icann.org/en/udrp/udrp-policy-24oct99.htm,last 
viewed on August 10, 2009. 
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cybersquatting, they did not provide a coherent theoretical basis for domain name 
regulation that might apply more generally.  Part of the reason for the narrowness in 
focus relates to the question as to who, if anyone, has constitutional power to make 
general policy for the domain space.  While ICANN administers the technical side of the 
domain name system, its by-laws limit its policy making role to “policy development 
reasonably and appropriately related to [its] technical functions.”7  Domestic legislatures 
and courts can only reach disputes within their jurisdictional competence.   
 
In the absence of a central policy-making body, each entity dealing with domain 
name conflicts can only address a small piece of a much larger puzzle.  This results in a 
domain name market that is regulated inconsistently, often leading to wasteful uses of 
potentially valuable online assets.  The domain space becomes clogged with registrations 
of multiple domain names by speculators who, more often than not, will park websites 
under the names and fail to use them for any particularly useful purpose, in the hope that 
someday they may sell the names for a profit.8  In the meantime, they may derive revenue 
from click-on advertising.9  Domain name speculators now typically rely on registrations 
of personal names, geographical and cultural indicators, and generic words and phrases in 
the domain space.10   
 
Thus, the practice of domain name speculating has moved away from trademark 
policy, while the regulatory system has not.  This creates an inconsistency between the 
robust regulation of trademarks in the domain space and the lack of regulation over any 
other conduct.  There is a glaring need to develop a coherent theory of domain name 
regulation.  Domain name conflicts are not likely to subside any time soon.11  
Additionally, the development of a more robust domain name theory may facilitate policy 
developments in the emerging area of search engine law.12    Domain name regulation will 
be an important aspect of search engine law because of the pivotal role played by domain 
names in search engine algorithms.13  Rules about balancing competing rights and 
                                                 
7
  Bylaws for Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numkers, Art I, Section 1(3). Full text 
available at: http://www.icann.org/en/general/bylaws.htm, last viewed on August 10, 2009. 
8
  KESMODEL, supra note ___, at 136-138 (2008) (describing the practice of domain name 
“parking”). 
9
  id, at 68-73 (describing the development of pay-per-click advertising systems). 
10
  id, at 24-33 (noting use of generic and other terms in the domain space by domain name 
speculators). 
11
  See, WIPO, Record Number of Cybersquatting Cases in 2008, WIPO Proposes Paperless UDRP, 
March 16, 2009 (available at http://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/articles/2009/article_0005.html, last 
viewed on August 10, 2009). 
12
  See Viva Moffat, Regulating Search, 22 HARVARD JOURNAL OF LAW AND 
TECHNOLOGY 475 (2009); Greg Lastowka, Google’s Law, 73 BROOKLYN L REV 1327 
(2008); Oren Bracha and Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission?  Access, Fairness 
and Accountability in the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L REV 1129 (2008); James 
Grimmelman, The Structure of Search Engine Law, 93 IOWA L REV 1 (2007); Urs Gasser, 
Regulating Search Engines:  Taking Stock and Looking Ahead, 8 YALE J L & TECH 201 
(2006); Eric Goldman, Search Engine Bias and The Rise of Search Engine Utopianism, 8 
YALE J L& TECH 188 (2006); Playboy v Netscape, 354 F.3d 1020 (2004); Rescuecom Corp., 
Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Google Inc., Defendant-Appellee, 2009 U.S. App LEXIS 7160 (2nd Cir, 
2009); Perfect 10 v Google, 508 F 3d 1146 (9th Cir, 2007). 
13
  In fact, Microsoft’s new search engine, Bing, has been criticized for giving too much weight to 
domain names in its search algorithm.  See Is Bing’s Algorithm Domain Name Heavy, blogpost at Search 
Domain Name Theory 
  4 
interests in the domain space will impact on search engine results.  Domain name theory 
may also assist search engines in developing policies about their own uses of trademarks, 
personal names, cultural and geographic indicators, and generic words in search engine 
algorithms and keyword advertising programs. 
 
The creation of a coherent theory for domain name regulation may also play an 
important role in the new generic Top Level Domain (gTLD) application process soon to 
be rolled out by ICANN.14  The identification of coherent theoretical principles governing 
the domain space will be imperative for the release of new gTLDs.15  The fact that 
ICANN may not have the constitutional power to implement all relevant policies itself - 
and that implementation may ultimately fall to a combination of domestic courts, 
legislators, and private arbitrators – means that relatively quick work is needed to create 
the theoretical groundwork.  If multiple bodies need to work together to create a 
workable regulatory matrix matrix, then the earlier appropriate policies can be identified, 
the better. 
 
Part II extrapolates three theoretical justifications for domain name regulation:  
property theory; trademark policy; and, restitution or unjust enrichment.  These three 
justifications may have to be developed simultaneously to create a useful framework for 
future domain name regulation.  Part III moves from the general to the specific in 
identifying regulatory inconsistencies in the domain space based on the current limited 
theoretical focus.  It considers particular instances of regulatory gaps including 
inconsistencies relating to the registration of domain names corresponding with 
trademarks, personal names, political words and phrases, cultural and geographic 
indicators, and generic words and phrases.  It suggests ways in which the theoretical 
models identified in Part II may assist in the development of more robust and consistent 
policy determinations going forwards.  Part IV considers the position of domain name 
registries in terms of potential liability for bad faith activities of their registrants.  Part V 
concludes by making suggestions for future directions in domain name regulation.   
 
II. THREE THEORIES OF DOMAIN NAME REGULATION 
 
A. EXTRAPOLATING THEORY FROM PRACTICE 
 
This Part extrapolates from past practice the implicit theoretical impulses that 
appear to have guided courts, legislatures, and ICANN in regulating the domain space to 
date.  Courts in early cybersquatting cases tended to focus squarely on existing trademark 
policy to regulate the domain space.  They found that cybersquatting constituted either 
trademark infringement or dilution, depending on the circumstances.16  Infringement 
                                                                                                                                                 
Engine Roundtable, July 13, 2009, available at http://www.seroundtable.com/archives/020382.html, last 
viewed on August 10, 2009. 
14
  Farley, supra note ___, at 625 (gTLDs are “generic top-level domains”), 626 (noting that ICANN 
has accredited 15 gTLDs to date including .com, .net, and .edu), 626 (noting that ICANN is now 
considering a new system to approve new gTLDs in the hundreds or thousands). 
15
  id., describing the mis-match between trademark policy and domain name regulation and the 
implications of the current inconsistencies for the proposed new gTLD process. 
16
  KESMODEL, supra note ___, at 23-24 (noting how early trademark law dealt effectively with 
cybersquatters). 
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requires the mark holder to establish a likelihood of consumer confusion as to the source 
of products or services.17  Dilution has no consumer confusion requirement and is limited 
to the protection of famous marks.18  The dilution action comes in two forms – blurring 
and tarnishment.  Blurring relates to the creation of noise around a mark that interferes 
with its capacity to operate as a mark.19  Tarnishment relates to the creation of unsavory 
associations with a mark.20   
 
Despite the early focus on trademark policy, the basis for applying traditional 
trademark doctrines to cybersquatting was a little confused, suggesting that a pure 
trademark-based policy model was insufficient for the domain space.  For example, the 
Ninth Circuit struggled to explain why a cybersquatter who conducted no commercial 
activities on his website was acting in commerce as required by the Lanham Act.21  A trial 
judge in the Southern District of New York likewise struggled to explain why a domain 
name registrant who was not conducting any significant commercial activities on his 
website was nevertheless potentially confusing consumers in commerce as required for a 
successful infringement action.22  While traditional trademark policy had its uses, the 
awkwardness of applying existing trademark doctrines to cybersquatting soon prompted 
action by the United States Congress and ICANN.  They adopted the ACPA and the 
UDRP respectively. 
 
While still expressly based on trademark policy, the new regulations were focused 
narrowly on specific domain name conduct: cybersquatting.  Each set of rules prohibits 
the registration of a domain name corresponding with someone else’s trademark23 with a 
bad faith profit motive.24  Both contain non-exhaustive lists of bad faith factors to guide 
courts and arbitrators.25  Both contain defenses for a person who has registered a domain 
name for a legitimate purpose.26  Neither specifically contemplates conflicts in the 
domain space outside of cybersquatting on other people’s trademarks.  The ACPA is a 
little broader in scope than the UDRP in that it contains an additional sui generis 
protection for personal names regardless of their trademark status.27  The fact that the 
ACPA extends protections to non-trademarked personal names suggests a broader 
regulatory impulse than that stemming solely from trademark policy.  While trademark 
policy obviously has a significant role to play in the ACPA, there must be other 
regulatory justifications at least in relation to the protection of non-trademarked personal 
names.  The statutory concern with bad faith intent to profit suggests an unjust 
enrichment – or restitutionary – rationale as an alternative policy basis for the legislation.   
 
                                                 
17
  15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1)(a); 1125(a)(1). 
18
  15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c)(1); 1125(c)(2)(A). 
19
  15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B). 
20
  15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(C). 
21
  Panavision v Toeppen, 141 F 3d 1316, 1324-1326, (9th Cir, 1998). 
22
  Planned Parenthood Federation of America v Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q. 1430 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), pp 13-15 
(LEXIS PAGE REFS). 
23
  Note that neither set of rules expressly requires the mark to be registered; thus each will protect 
unregistered marks. 
24
  15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i); UDRP, para 4(a)(iii). 
25
  15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i); UDRP, para 4(b). 
26
  15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(ii); UDRP, para 4(c). 
27
  15 U.S.C. § 1129(1)(A).   
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It should be noted that despite concerns about the scope of their underlying 
theoretical justifications, the ACPA and the UDRP have been effective in practice in the 
context of traditional cybersquatting on trademarks.  The UDRP, in particular, is 
inexpensive, accessible, and efficient,28 and does not raise the jurisdictional concerns 
inherent in litigation.29  The UDRP is incorporated by reference into registration 
agreements for all domain names utilizing gTLDs such as “.com”, “.org”, and “.net”.30  
The major limitation of the UDRP today is that most modern disputes today do not 
involve traditional trademark cybersquatting.  The more recent conflicts raise issues not 
so neatly resolved by a trademark policy rationale.  Thus, there is a need to find other 
theoretical explanations for domain name policy that could work alongside the existing, 
but limited, trademark policy justification.  As suggested in the previous paragraph, 
existing practice suggests at least two distinct, but sometimes overlapping, policy 
justifications for domain name regulation:  trademark policy, and restitution or unjust 
enrichment.  To this, we might add a property rights justification for regulation in some 
more unusual circumstances involving bad faith conduct in the domain space.31 
 
B. A TRIPARTITE THEORETICAL MODEL:  PROPERTY THEORY, RESTITUTION, 
AND TRADEMARK POLICY 
 
Of the three theoretical justifications for domain name regulation, a property 
rights justification may at first glance appear to be the most intuitively appealing.  This is 
because the domain name market involves routine trading of domain name assets.32  
Since the early days of the commercial Internet, domain names have been equated with 
property rights in a variety of contexts.33  Real world property analogies can be easily 
made with domain names, although each analogy has limitations.  It is easy to think about 
bad faith conduct involving domain names in terms of trespass or conversion.  One might 
describe cybersquatting as a form of trespassing – or squatting - on someone else’s virtual 
property.  Generally, a property holder in the real world can remove a trespasser if the 
trespasser has not used the property for long enough to raise a plausible adverse 
possession argument.34  
 
                                                 
28
  Jacqueline Lipton, Celebrity in Cyberspace, 65 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW 1445, 1448-
9 (2008) (“The advantages of the UDRP over litigation are that it is inexpensive and fast compared to 
litigation, and its reach is effectively global because relevant parties are bound to it by contract wherever 
they may physically reside.  Thus, it has been the avenue of choice for most domain name complainants.”) 
[hereinafter, Celebrity in Cyberspace] 
29
  id, at 1474 (“The actor Kevin Spacey … failed to establish personal jurisdiction over a defendant 
in litigation for control of the domain name <kevinspacey.com>.  He then went on to successfully obtain 
control of the name in a UDRP proceeding.”) 
30
  See http://www.icann.org/en/udrp/udrp-policy-24oct99.htm, at Note 2, last viewed on August 10, 
2009. 
31
  See discussion in Part II.B infra. 
32
  For a general discussion of modern domain name markets, see KESMODEL, supra note ___. 
33
  See, for example, Kremen v Cohen, 337 F 3d 1024 (9th Cir 2003) (finding domain name to be 
property for the purposes of the Californian statutory tort of conversion). 
34
  Walter Quentin Impert, Whose Land is it Anyway?  It’s Time to Reconsider Sovereign Immunity 
from Adverse Possession, 49 U.C.L.A. LAW REV 447, 448 (2001) (“People are often surprised to learn that 
a trespasser may take title to land from a true owner under certain conditions and that such theft is 
authorized by the government under laws of adverse possession.”) 
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Trespass is not the only property analogy that can be made with cybersquatting.  
Early cybersquatters did not regard themselves as trespassers.  Some thought of 
themselves as being more like property speculators.35  They took a gamble that certain 
pieces of virtual property – domain names corresponding with other people’s trademarks 
– would be more valuable to the mark holders than to anyone else.  Thus, a cybersquatter 
who could beat a markholder to registration could make a handsome profit.  In the real 
world, there is nothing wrong with this entrepreneurial impulse.  If I buy property 
adjacent to your land in the hope of selling it to you for a profit because I have speculated 
that you may want to expand your business onto the land, I am within my rights to charge 
whatever price I want for the sale.   
 
The problem is that neither of these real property analogies is a perfect fit for the 
virtual world.  The speculating analogy ultimately falls short because a trademark holder 
does have some rights in a domain name corresponding with her trademark as a matter of 
trademark policy.36  A real property holder, on the other hand, has no pre-existing rights 
in adjacent land.  The trespass analogy is also problematic because it is only possible in 
the real world to trespass on land that another person legally owns.  Even though a 
trademark holder may have some interest in a domain name corresponding with her mark, 
she does not own the domain name unless she has registered it. 
 
Under current regulations like the ACPA and the UDRP, we might infer that there 
is an implicit assumption that a trademark holder has property rights in corresponding 
domain names.  However, the full extent of those rights is unclear.  Some judges and 
arbitrators have suggested that those rights might extend to “trademark.com” domain 
names, but not necessarily to other iterations of the trademark in the domain space.37  
Nevertheless, this view is not universally accepted.38  Thus, while a property rights 
rationale for domain name regulation is useful, what is currently missing is guidance as to 
the nature and scope of any property rights that may be protected in the domain space.  
This question becomes even more complex when one departs from the more familiar 
trademark territory and turns to consideration of property rights in personal names, 
geographic and cultural indicators, and generic terms in the domain space.  Applying the 
                                                 
35
  See www.toeppen.com, last viewed on August 10, 2009 (“In 1995, I registered about 200 domain 
names. Some were generic English words, like hydrogen.com. Others corresponded with trademarks that 
were shared by more than one company, like americanstandard.com. And some corresponded with 
trademarked coined words, like panavision.com.  
It was clear to me at the time that domain names were valuable, undeveloped virtual real estate. There was 
absolutely no statutory or case law regarding trademarks in the context of Internet domain names at the 
time. It seemed to be an excellent opportunity to do the virtual equivalent of buying up property around a 
factory -- eventually the factory owner would realize that he needed the scarce resource which I 
possessed.”) 
36
  This is evidenced by the availability of trademark infringement and dilution actions in early 
cyberqsuatting cases:  KESMODEL, supra note ___, at 23-24. 
37
  See, for example, discussion in Jacqueline Lipton, Commerce versus Commentary:  Gripe Sites, 
Parody, and the First Amendment in Cyberspace, 84 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY L REV 1327, 1359-1361 
(2006) [hereinafter, Commerce versus Commentary]. 
38
  For example, the majority panelists in Bruce Springsteen v Jeff Burgar, WIPO Arbitration and 
Mediation Center Case No D2000-1532 (Jan 2001) where prepared to allow an unauthorized use of the 
“brucespringsteen.com” domain name by a fan who had registered it, on the basis that Bruce Springsteen 
had his own web presence under “brucespringsteen.net”.  The majority panelists accepted a trademark in 
Springsteen’s name with some reservations, but decided the case on other grounds. 
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property rights rationale, we might argue that a person has property rights in her name 
that could be protected against those seeking to profit from the name in the domain space.  
However, many commentators reject property rights in a personal name.39  
 
The property rights rationale may nevertheless be useful in some admittedly 
limited circumstances involving generic domain names.  There have been a few cases 
where a domain name “thief” has fraudulently secured a transfer of a generic domain 
name initially registered to another person.40  The obtaining of the fraudulent transfer by 
the wrongdoer has been likened by some commentators to theft or conversion of physical 
property in the real world.41  The willingness to attach a property label to the virtual 
property in these cases has enabled at least one court to attach secondary liability to a 
domain name registry where the fraudulent transferee could not be located.42  Thus, the 
property rights rationale for domain name regulation may have a place in a broader 
theoretical justification for domain name law.  However, its usefulness may be limited to 
fairly unusual cases. 
 
The trademark policy rationale, on the other hand, now has a more pronounced 
place in the regulatory matrix.  It has been very useful in the regulation of cybersquatting.  
While the UDRP in particular has become the most popular avenue for cybersquatting 
disputes, trademark infringement and dilution actions, and some ACPA cases still filter 
                                                 
39
  Mark McKenna, The Right of Publicity and Autonomous Self-Definition, 67 U PITT L REV 225, 
247 (2005) (“It might be true that identity is sufficiently similar to other objects the law regards as property 
and therefore deserves at least some of the sticks in the traditional bundle of property rights. But far too few 
courts and commentators have offered a theory as to why any of the traditional property justifications lead 
to that conclusion. Such approaches are reflective of the general imprecision that has plagued the right of 
publicity.”).  
40
  Kremen v Cohen, 337 F 3d 1024 (9th Cir 2003) (involving “sex.com”).  See also Purva Patel, Not 
Masters of Their (Web) Domains After All:  Stolen Internet Names Difficult to Track, Houston Chronicle, 
August 5, 2009, available at http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/tech/news/6560302.html, last viewed on 
August 10, 2009 (involving “p2p.com” domain name). 
41
  Kremen v Cohen, 337 F 3d 1024 (9th Cir 2003) (holding fraudulently obtained transfer of 
“sex.com” domain name to be conversion under Californian tort statute). 
42
  id., at 1030 (“Property is a broad concept that includes "every intangible benefit and prerogative 
susceptible of possession or disposition." …. We apply a three-part test to determine whether a property 
right exists: "First, there must be an interest capable of precise definition; second, it must be capable of 
exclusive possession or control; and third, the putative owner must have established a legitimate claim to 
exclusivity." ….. Domain names satisfy each criterion. Like a share of corporate stock or a plot of land, a 
domain name is a well-defined interest. Someone who registers a domain name decides where on the 
Internet those who invoke that particular name -- whether by typing it into their web browsers, by 
following a hyperlink, or by other means -- are sent. Ownership is exclusive in that the registrant alone 
makes that decision. Moreover, like other forms of property, domain names are valued, bought and sold, 
often for millions of dollars,…, and they are now even subject to in rem jurisdiction …. Finally, registrants 
have a legitimate claim to exclusivity. Registering a domain name is like staking a claim to a plot of land at 
the title office. It informs others that the domain name is the registrant's and no one else's. Many registrants 
also invest substantial time and money to develop and promote websites that depend on their domain 
names. Ensuring that they reap the benefits of their investments reduces uncertainty and thus encourages 
investment in the first place, promoting the growth of the Internet overall…. Kremen therefore had an 
intangible property right in his domain name, and a jury could find that Network Solutions "wrongfully 
disposed of" that right to his detriment by handing the domain name over to Cohen.”) 
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through domestic courts to protect trademark rights in the domain space.43  The 
trademark policy rationale breaks down into at least two, and possibly three, distinct 
elements.  The two most obvious sub-sets of trademark policy relate to the protection of 
trademark holders against infringement and dilution respectively.  The ACPA may 
ground a third trademark-policy rationale for domain name regulation, if “bad faith 
cybersquatting on trademarks” is regarded as a separate head of trademark policy distinct 
from the infringement and dilution impulses.44  The UDRP can be justified on the basis of 
trademark policy because of its focus on trademark-protection, and the tracking of 
trademark doctrine in its drafting.45  However, recent UDRP arbitrations evidence some 
straying from this theoretical underpinning to the extent that arbitrators are prepared to 
grant protection for less obviously trademarked terms like personal names.46 
 
A third policy rationale for domain name regulation that may explain the bleeding 
of UDRP policy outside of clear trademark doctrine into some other areas not so easily 
justified under traditional trademark theory may be found in restitution – or unjust 
enrichment - theory.  Restitution is less well developed in the United States than in some 
other countries.47  Nevertheless, the basic premise is that a defendant has been unjustly 
enriched at the expense of a complainant, and the plaintiff is entitled to a remedy.48  The 
advantage of restitution theory is that it does not require a property right in the hands of 
the complainant.49  Thus, it might explain domain name conflicts where a domain name 
registrant has taken advantage of the goodwill a complainant has built up in a word or 
phrase regardless of whether the complainant has a property, or trademark, right in that 
word or phrase.   
 
This might occur in the case of personal names that have not acquired trademark 
status, or in the context of geographical terms where, say, a local tourist board has built 
up some goodwill in the name of a city, but not in a trademark sense.50  To support an 
unjust enrichment justification, the domain name registrant must have been enriched at 
                                                 
43
  See, for example, Bosley v Kremer, 403 F.3d 672  (2005); People for the Ethical Treatment of 
Animals v Doughney, 263 F.3d 359  (2001). 
44
  15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1). 
45
  UDRP, paras 4(a), 4(b) and 4(c). 
46
  Lipton, Celebrity in Cyberspace, supra note ___, at 1527 (“The continued development of 
personal domain name jurisprudence based on trademark principles threatens to warp the boundaries of 
trademark law and to unjustifiably extend trademark practice online into areas where the alleged 
trademarks are mere fictions…. In any event, the application of the trademark-based UDRP to personal 
domain name disputes is clearly creating inconsistent results.”) 
47
  The American law on restitution is currently stated in the Restatement of the Law, Restitution 
(1937). 
48
  id., at § 1 (“A person who has been unjustly enriched at the expense of another is required to make 
restitution to the other.”) 
49
  id, at Comment b (“A person confers a benefit upon another if he gives to the other possession of 
or some other interest in money, land, chattels, or choses in action, performs services beneficial to or at the 
request of the other, satisfies a debt or a duty of the other, or in any way adds to the other's security or 
advantage. He confers a benefit not only where he adds to the property of another, but also where he saves 
the other from expense or loss. The word "benefit," therefore, denotes any form of advantage.”) 
50
  GILSON ON TRADEMARKS, § 2.03[4][d] (“Just as with descriptive terms, a trademark or trade name 
that consists of a personal name (first name, surname, or both) is entitled to legal protection only if it attains 
secondary meaning.”). 
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the expense of the plaintiff.  Thus, a restitutionary rationale for domain name regulation 
will be limited to situations where a registrant has profited unjustly from a domain name 
in which the complainant has legitimate, although potentially non-proprietary or non-
trademark, interests.  An example might be where the defendant operates a clickfarm 
from a domain name in which the plaintiff has some legitimate interests.  The 
identification of these three distinct, albeit sometimes overlapping, theoretical 
justifications might assist in resolving some of the current gaps and inconsistencies 
inherent in domain name regulation. 
 
III. EXISTING REGULATORY INCONSISTENCIES 
 
A. GENERAL REGULATORY INCONSISTENCIES 
 
The current state of domain name regulation might be summarized as set out in 
Table 1.  This table matches the various motivations for domain name registration against 
the most obvious categories of words and phrases that are commonly registered as 
domain names.  The individual cells within the table identify the extent to which each 
pairing of market motivations with word type is regulated under existing rules.  The 
results evidence an inconsistent and unpredictable pastiche of regulations.  There is not a 
clear and consistent underlying theoretical basis for domain name regulation. 
 
Domain Name Theory 
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Table 1:  Relationship Between Registrants’ Motivations and Categories of Domain 
Name Registered 
 
 Sale Motive Clickfarming 
Motive 
Expressive Use Legitimate 
Commercial 
Use 
Trademarks  Traditional 
cybersquatting 
Potentially 
cybersquatting 
Usually legitimate, 
particularly if the 
registrant does not 
use the “.com” 
version of the 
name51 
Competing 
TM interests – 
first come, first 
served 
Personal Names Traditional 
cybersquatting (if 
name is 
trademarked) and 
15 U.S.C. § 
1129(1)(A) liability 
(regardless of 
trademark) 
Potentially 
cybersquatting (if 
name is 
trademarked); little 
recourse if no 
trademark 
Usually legitimate 
use, particularly if 
registrant does not 
use “.com” version 
of trademarked 
personal name 
Competing 
personal 
names – first 
come first 
served. 
Cultural and 
geographic 
indicators 
No regulation 
unless name is 
trademarked 
No regulation unless 
term is trademarked 
Presumptively 
legitimate use 
Presumptively 
legitimate use 
Generic words & 
phrases 
Presumptively 
legitimate use 
Presumptively 
legitimate use 
Presumptively 
legitimate use 
Presumptively 
legitimate use 
Deliberate 
misspellings of 
trademarks  
Cybersquatting Potentially 
cybersquatting 
Unclear – 
potentially 
legitimate use 
No legitimate 
use 
Deliberate 
misspellings of 
personal names 
Cybersquatting (if 
name is 
trademarked); little 
recourse if no 
trademark 
Potentially 
cybersquatting (if 
name is 
trademarked); little 
recourse if no 
trademark 
Unclear – 
potentially 
legitimate use 
No legitimate 
use 
“trademarksucks” 
names 
Unclear Unclear – 
potentially 
trademark 
infringement, 
dilution or 
cybersquatting 
Generally 
legitimate use 
No legitimate 
use 
 
 
The only conduct that is clearly sanctioned under current regulations is traditional 
cybersquatting – represented in the first and fifth rows of Column 1.  The regulation of 
other conduct is largely unclear.  It is possible to discern some general principles about 
domain name regulation from this table, but at a fairly high level of abstraction.  For 
example, purely expressive uses of domain names are for the most part regarded as being 
legitimate, regardless of the type of word or phrase registered – see Column 3.  Even 
expressive uses of trademarks (Column 3, Row 1) and of deliberate misspellings of 
                                                 
51
  Lipton, Commerce versus Commentary, supra note ___, at 1359-1361. 
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trademarks (Column 3, Row 5) may be legitimate uses if the associated website is used 
for commentary, rather than commercial purposes.       
 
 Another general principle that may be derived from Table 1 is that registration of 
a deliberate misspelling of another person’s trademark is presumptively illegitimate, at 
least if undertaken for a commercial purpose.  In fact, it is difficult to conceive of a 
situation where someone registers a deliberate misspelling of another person’s trademark 
for a purely expressive purpose, although it is possible that the operator of a purely 
expressive gripe site or parody site may want to engage in this conduct.  In any event, the 
fifth and six rows of Column 4 are shaded out because it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
conceive of any legitimate commercial purpose for registering a deliberate misspelling of 
another’s mark or name.     
 
 Table 1 also illustrates the confusion inherent with respect to “sucks”-type 
domain names.52  These are names that use a trademark with a pejorative word or phrase 
attached: for example “nikesucks.com”.  Typically, these domains are used for gripe sites 
– websites that include critical commentary about a trademark holder.53  However, these 
kinds of names are sometimes used for commercial purposes such as cybersquatting or 
clickfarming.54  Where pejorative domain names are used for commercial purposes, they 
are sometimes referred to as “sham speech” domain names.55  There is currently no clear 
regulatory approach to “sucks”-type domain names.56  While most commercial uses of 
such names are colorably illegitimate as they take advantage of the goodwill in a 
trademark to draw custom for a non-related commercial purpose,57 some uses are 
legitimately expressive and others combine expressive and commercial elements.  The 
development of a more coherent theoretical framework for domain name regulation 
might assist in ascertaining what kinds of conduct concerning “sucks”-type domain 
names should be proscribed, and on what basis.  A theoretical framework based on both 
trademark policy and unjust enrichment may be useful here to separate legitimate 
expressive uses of “sucks”-type domain names from bad faith commercial uses. 
 
Another notable feature of Table 1 is that it highlights the position of clickfarming 
in the context of current domain name regulations.  Most clickfarming involving 
trademarks or deliberate misspellings of trademarks is potentially regulated as a form of 
cybersquatting.  This is because clickfarms that utilize other people’s trademarks 
essentially use the marks for bad faith commercial profit motives.  The commercial profit 
motive in clickfarming is different from traditional cybersquatting.  For clickfarmers, the 
profit is not derived from a sale of the name, but rather from using the name to generate 
revenue from click-through advertisements.58  Nevertheless, most cybersquatting 
regulations are broad enough to encompass this kind of conduct.  In the ACPA, for 
                                                 
52
  DAVID LINDSAY, INTERNATIONAL DOMAIN NAME LAW:  ICANN AND THE UDRP, 262 (2007). 
53
  id. 
54
  id. 
55
  id. 
56
  id. 
57
  This is why the last cell at the bottom of Column 4 in Table 1 is shaded out. 
58
  Jacqueline Lipton, Clickfarming:  The New Cybersquatting?, 12 Journal of Internet Law 1,1 
(2008) [hereinafter, Clickfarming]. 
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example, the notion of a bad faith intent to profit from a mark is not inextricably linked to 
a sale motive.59  The bad faith factors in the UDRP are likewise not limited to a sale 
motive.  The intention to sell the domain name is only one of four non-exclusive bad faith 
factors in the UDRP.60 
 
Clickfarming involving words and phrases other than trademarks has a less clear 
regulatory rationale.  Personal names, and cultural and geographic terms that operate as 
registered or unregistered marks will likely be protected from clickfarming in the same 
way as other trademarks.61  However, non-trademarked names, words and phrases are 
more troublesome.  While various individuals and entities may have legitimate interests 
in these terms, in the absence of a trademark, they have little recourse against 
clickfarmers.  Even the sui generis personal name protections in the Lanham Act will not 
cover clickfarming because those provisions are limited to prohibiting registrations of 
personal names as domain names with a sale motive.62   
 
There is nothing necessarily wrong with this state of affairs if the regulatory 
policy is that clickfarming is problematic only in trademark cases, on the basis that the 
registrant is making unfair commercial profits from a valuable mark.  The rationale for 
distinguishing non-trademarked personal names, cultural and geographic indicators and 
generic terms here would be that the people and entities with interests in those terms have 
not necessarily put the same resources into developing goodwill in relevant words as the 
trademark holder.  However, this rationale may not bear close scrutiny.   
 
Even an individual with no trademark interest in her personal name may have 
spent time and resources into building up a public persona.  Politicians, for example, may 
not have commercial trademark interests in their names, but may nevertheless have spent 
much time, effort and resources building up their professional reputations.  The ability of 
a clickfarmer to take unfair advantage of that reputation should arguably be sanctioned on 
the same basis as the regulation of clickfarming that utilizes trademarks.  Likewise, local 
city councils may spend significant time and effort building up a reputation for their city 
to attract tourism or business.  It is not clear why those entities should be denied 
protection against clickfarmers trading on their geographical reputations while trademark 
holders are protected. 
 
The failure to develop any regulations that prevent the monopolization of 
different classes of words and phrases by clickfarmers creates a situation in which the 
Internet potentially becomes clogged with clickfarms.  Words and phrases that could be 
used for more useful expressive or commercial purposes are effectively monopolized or 
held to ransom by domain name speculators.  The way in which one responds to this state 
of affairs depends on the view one has of the domain name market more generally.  Free 
                                                 
59
  15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i). 
60
  UDRP, para 4(b)(i). 
61
  GILSON ON TRADEMARKS, § 2.03[4][d] (“Just as with descriptive terms, a trademark or trade name 
that consists of a personal name (first name, surname, or both) is entitled to legal protection only if it attains 
secondary meaning.”). 
62
  15 U.S.C. § 1129(1)(A). 
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market advocates may well support domain name speculators who run clickfarms.  
Others may be disappointed that the Internet will likely be unable to reach its full 
potential as a global communications medium if more and more of its online addresses 
are taken up by poorly maintained clickfarms advertising products that few people 
want.63   
 
Nevertheless, even those who support regulation to preserve the potential of the 
Internet by reining in clickfarming face the problem of identifying: (a) a theoretical 
rationale for regulation; (b) an entity with constitutional competence to regulate; and, (c) 
a party or group with sufficient standing to enforce any regulations that may be 
developed.  These are extremely difficult questions, and this article focuses 
predominantly on the first.  The idea is that without a clear theoretical basis for 
regulating, the following questions are moot.  With no clear theoretical idea of the basis 
for regulations, it does not matter who theoretically might regulate or how those 
regulations might be enforced.64   
 
B. SPECIFIC INCONSISTENCIES AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
 
1. Personal Names 
 
This sub-Part addresses specific instances of the regulatory inconsistencies 
identified in the previous section.  It focuses on particular kinds of words and phrases 
commonly registered in modern domain name markets.  Trademarks are no longer the 
coin of the realm in these markets as the most intuitively trademark-focused domain 
names are now in the hands of trademark holders.  Current battles revolve around other 
words and phrases.  One obvious example is personal names.  Personal names have come 
to the forefront of many modern domain name battles because of their obvious 
commercial value and their uncertain trademark status.65  Many famous people cannot 
necessarily assert trademarks in their personal names.66  This is especially true of famous 
                                                 
63
  KESMODEL, supra note ___, at 138 (“Although domain parking clearly has been good for investors 
and networks, the level of value the sites offer to consumers has been hotly debated.  Some critics say the 
proliferation of the bare-bones [clickfarms] has sullied the Internet.  Some liken the millions of ad-bloated 
sites to an endless stream of billboards along a highway, distracting drivers and ruining the scenery.”) 
64
  This is a bit of an oversimplification, because in reality the three regulatory questions overlap to 
some extent.  One might argue that in the absence of a competent regulating entity, the idea of formulating 
theory is arguably moot because no body could meaningfully implement relevant policies.  Even if there is 
a competent entity – or entities – that might implement policy in new regulations, the regulations will be 
meaningless if aggrieved persons either do not have standing or do not have sufficient access to dispute 
resolution forums to enforce them.  Nevertheless, there is some value in focusing on theory of regulation as 
an initial matter.  There are currently bodies who implement regulations, albeit in a piecemeal way.  They 
include ICANN, UDRP arbitrators, and domestic courts.  The increasing pace of UDRP arbitrations over 
the year also suggests that there is a significant body of complainants with sufficient standing to enforce 
existing regulations – even if they are currently obliged to frame their complaints in trademark terms. 
65
  GILSON ON TRADEMARKS, § 2.03[4][d] (“Just as with descriptive terms, a trademark or trade name 
that consists of a personal name (first name, surname, or both) is entitled to legal protection only if it attains 
secondary meaning.”). 
66
  id. 
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people who do not use their names in commerce: for example, politicians and some other 
public figures.67   
 
Domain name speculators often register personal names as domain names with 
the aim of defending against any subsequent complaints on the basis of either a lack of a 
trademark interest in the hands of the complainant, or possibly a lack of bad faith conduct 
on the part of the registrant.68  It is usually relatively easy for domain name speculators to 
beat famous people to registration of their names because many famous individuals, 
unlike trademark holders, do not have, plan for, or even desire, an Internet presence.69  
Thus, many valuable personal names are not initially registered by the people to whom 
the names relate.  The failure by those individuals to register the names leaves ample 
opportunity for cybersquatters, clickfarmers and others to profit from the names.  The 
failure to register is also understandable because a name is supposed to be used once it is 
registered.  A registrant has to do something with the associated website.  Many famous 
people do not want to use the names at all.  They simply do not want other people to 
register them.70 
  
Personal name conflicts in the domain space have involved all kinds of people: 
actors,71 singers,72 sports stars,73 politicians,74 prominent business people,75 and other 
                                                 
67
  Lipton, Celebrity in Cyberspace, supra note ___, at 1462-1468 (describing mismatch between 
trademark law and the status of the personal names of politicians and public figures).  See also Jacqueline 
Lipton, Who Owns ‘hillary.com’?  Political Speech and the First Amendment in Cyberspace, 49 BOSTON 
COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 55 (2008). 
68
  William J Clinton v Web of Deception, Claim Number: FA0904001256123, National Arbitration 
Forum, full text available at http://domains.adrforum.com/domains/decisions/1256123.htm , last viewed on 
August 10, 2009.  Registrant of <williamclinton.com>, <williamjclinton.com> and 
<presidentbillclinton.com>, argued that the complainant had no trademark rights in his personal name, and 
that the registrant had not registered and was not using the names in bad faith.  Although the former 
President established trademark rights in his personal name, the registrant’s bad faith argument was 
successful and the arbitrator did not order transfer of the names to the former President. 
69
  See discussion of the dispute involving the name “juliaroberts.com” in Jacqueline Lipton, Beyond 
Cybersquatting:  Taking Domain Name Disputes Past Trademark Policy, 40 WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW 
1361, 1414-1415 (2005) [hereinafter, Beyond Cybersquatting]. 
70
  id. 
71
  Julia Fiona Roberts v Russell Boyd, WIPO Case No. D2000-0210, 30 May, 2000 (available at 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0210.html ) (involving juliaroberts.com 
domain name); Tom Cruise v Alberta Hot Rods, WIPO Case No D2006-0560, 5 July, 2006 (available at 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2006/d2006-0560.html) (involving tomcruise.com 
domain name); Kevin Spacey v Alberta Hot Rods, National Arbitration Forum Claim No 114437, August 1, 
2002 (available at http://www.arb-forum.com/domains/decisions/114437.htm) (involving the domain name 
kevinspacey.com). 
72
  See, for example, Bruce Springsteen v Jeff Burgar and Bruce Springsteen Club, WIPO Case No. 
D2000-1532, Jan. 25, 2001 (available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-
1532.html) (involving brucespringsteen.com domain name);  Madonna Ciccone v Dan Parisi, WIPO Case 
No. D2000-0847, Oct. 12, 2000 (available at 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0847.html) (involving Madonna.com 
domain name); Experience Hendrix LLC v Denny Hammerton, WIPO Case. No. D2000-0364, August 2, 
2000, aff’d August 15, 2000 (available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-
0364.html ) (involving jimihendrix.com domain name). 
73
  See, for example Bjorn Borg v Miguel Garcia, WIPO Case No. D2007-0591, June 21, 2007 
(available at:  http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2007/d2007-0591.html ) (involving the 
domain name bjornborg.com). 
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public figures.76  Additionally, some disputes have involved the names of private 
individuals, although these are less common because non-famous names are less valuable 
to domain name speculators.77  The recorded conflicts evidence a variety of motivations 
for registration, including commercial and expressive purposes, and combinations of 
both.  For example, a private individual registered the domain name 
“brucespringsteen.com” for an unauthorized fan site about the popular singer, Bruce 
Springsteen.78  This is by and large an expressive purpose, although it is also possible for 
fan site operators to make commercial profits by charging fees to join a fan club or 
subscribe to a newsletter, or by operating a clickfarm on the website.79 
 
As this article is focused on the extent to which a better theory of domain name 
regulation could help with current domain name problems, a question arises as to whether 
such a theory would help with personal names.  While existing regulations have been 
premised on trademark policy, the regulations have been skewed towards protection of 
trademarks.80  Trademark policy does not always provide the best protection for personal 
names.  A pure trademark focus, for example, fails to explain the regulatory impulse 
behind § 1129(1)(A) of the Lanham Act – the sui generis personal name protections 
against cybersquatting.  Clearly, the legislature saw a need to protect personal names.  
However, Congress’s actions cannot be explained solely with respect to trademark 
policy.  There must be some other theoretical justification.   
 
The unjust enrichment model might help with personal names.  Unjust enrichment 
theory does not require a trademark or even a generic property right to ground a claim for 
relief.  Table 2 contains examples of five hypothetical scenarios involving personal 
domain names.  The subsequent discussion illustrates how the adoption of a clearer 
policy basis for the domain space – potentially based on unjust enrichment - might help 
to resolve the conflicts arising in these scenarios. 
                                                                                                                                                 
74
  William J Clinton v Web of Deception, Claim Number: FA0904001256123, National Arbitration 
Forum, full text available at http://domains.adrforum.com/domains/decisions/1256123.htm , last viewed on 
August 10, 2009; Hillary Rodham Clinton v Michele Dinoia, National Arbitration Forum Claim No 
FA0502000414641, March 18, 2005 (full text available at http://www.arb-
forum.com/domains/decisions/414641.htm); Kathleen Kennedy Townsend v Birt, WIPO Case No D2002-
0030, April 11, 2002 (available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2002/d2002-
0030.html). 
75
  Trudeau v Lanoue, 2006 U.S. Dixt. LEXIS 7956 (2006); Stephan Schmidheiny v Steven Weber, 
285 F. Supp. 2d 613 (2003). 
76
  Anna Nicole Smith v DNS Research Inc, Claim No. FA0312000220007, National Arbitration 
Forum, Feb 21, 2004 (available at:  http://www.adrforum.com/domains/decisions/220007.htm) (involving 
annanicolesmith.com domain name); The Hebrew University of Jerusalem v Alberta Hot Rods, WIPO Case 
No. D2002-0616, October 7, 2002, (available at 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2002/d2002-0616.html) (involving a complaint with 
respect to the domain name <alberteinstein.com>). 
77
  Paul Wright v Domain Source Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16024 (2002). 
78
  Bruce Springsteen v Jeff Burgar and Bruce Springsteen Club, WIPO Case No. D2000-1532, Jan. 
25, 2001 (available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-1532.html). 
79
  Lipton, Clickfarming, supra note ___, at 16 (describing practice of clickfarming on personal 
names). 
80
  Lipton, Beyond Cybersquatting, supra note ___, at 1363 (“current dispute resolution mechanisms 
are focused on the protection of commercial trademark interests, often to the detriment of other socially 
important interests that may inhere in a given domain name.”) 
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Table 2:  Hypothetical Scenarios Involving Personal Names in the Domain Space 
 
 
Scenario 1.  An individual registers a domain name corresponding with the name 
of an internationally famous Democrat ex-president with a view to illuminating the lack 
of regulation for cybersquatting on personal names.  Ultimately, he directs the domain 
name to a website containing information posted by the Republican National Committee.  
He makes no attempt to sell the name to the ex-president or to anyone else.81 
 
Scenario 2.  An individual registers a domain name corresponding with the name 
of a minor celebrity known mainly for her reality TV show.  She rose to fame as a model 
with a weight problem who married a wealthy millionaire, but does not use her name to 
sell any particular products or services.  The registrant would be prepared to sell the name 
to her for an acceptable fee.82 
 
Scenario 3.  An individual registers a domain name corresponding with the name 
of a famous movie star for an unauthorized fan site containing click-on advertisements.  
It is clear from the content of the website that it is not the “official” fan site for the movie 
star.  The click-through advertisements on the website are unrelated to any of the movie 
star’s professional activities.  The registrant makes no attempt to sell the name, although, 
she would be prepared to consider an offer if it was forthcoming.83 
 
Scenario 4.  An individual registers a domain name corresponding with the name 
of a famous movie star.  She puts minimal content on the associated website – a two 
paragraph plain text description of the actor’s movies.  She conducts no commercial 
activities from the website and makes no offer to sell the name. 
 
Scenario 5.  A young, little known junior senator from the midwest makes a 
speech at the Democratic National Convention.  It is a major hit with the people.  The 
next day the national newspapers are abuzz with speculation that the senator is going to 
be the next major star of the Democratic Party and may even run for president in a 
subsequent election.  A domain name entrepreneur registers the senator’s name as a 
domain name, thinking that it may be valuable one day. 
 
It is difficult to apply existing domain name regulations to these scenarios.  The 
first hurdle in all five scenarios is that the complainant needs a trademark in his or her 
personal name for the most affordable avenue of recourse - a UDRP arbitration.84  This 
                                                 
81
  This hypothetical is based on: William J Clinton v Web of Deception, Claim Number: 
FA0904001256123, National Arbitration Forum, full text available at 
http://domains.adrforum.com/domains/decisions/1256123.htm , last viewed on August 10, 2009. 
82
  This hypothetical is based on:  Anna Nicole Smith v DNS Research Inc, Claim No. 
FA0312000220007, National Arbitration Forum, Feb 21, 2004 (available at:  
http://www.adrforum.com/domains/decisions/220007.htm) (involving annanicolesmith.com domain name). 
83
  This hypothetical is based on: Tom Cruise v Alberta Hot Rods, WIPO Case No D2006-0560, 5 
July, 2006 (available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2006/d2006-0560.html) 
(involving tomcruise.com domain name). 
84
  UDRP, para 4(a)(i). 
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may be difficult to establish even in the case of famous names.85  With respect to Scenario 
5, for example, an unknown politician would not likely be successful.  However, an 
unknown politician who later became famous and used his name in commerce – for 
example, by selling campaign merchandise relating to his name – might later succeed in a 
UDRP arbitration.  In this scenario, he would need to establish that the registrant was 
using the name in bad faith and not for any legitimate purpose.86  An attempt to sell the 
name for a profit in the course of a subsequent presidential election may satisfy this 
requirement.   
 
This seems theoretically unsatisfying.  There is no clear principle to guide 
registrants on what conduct is legitimate here.  The reliance on the trademark policy 
rationale underlying the UDRP creates significant uncertainty in relation to its application 
to personal name disputes.  Unjust enrichment theory, on the other hand, might support 
rules to ensure return of a domain name to a rightful owner – or at least cancellation of 
the registration - in cases where a registrant had taken unfair commercial advantage of the 
name.  This approach would not interfere with free speech as it would be based on unjust 
commercial enrichments – not on use of another’s name for expressive purposes.   
 
Applying an unjust enrichment approach to Scenario 1 in Table 2, for example, 
we might find that a registrant who has used a politician’s name for purely expressive and 
non-commercial purposes should not be subject to a transfer or cancellation order.  While 
at least one UDRP decision supports this result, the underlying theoretical rationale for 
the decision is trademark policy.  In other words, applying the UDRP as written, an 
arbitrator found that, although former President William J Clinton did have a trademark 
in his personal name, the registrant was not acting in bad faith in registering the name for 
an expressive purpose.87  It would make more sense as a matter of theory and practice for 
such disputes to be decided not on the grounds of trademark policy, but on the grounds of 
unjust enrichment.  An unjust enrichment rationale would support the development of 
new regulations that do not require individuals to rely on trademarks in their personal 
names in order to seek relief.   
 
The ACPA personal name action provides an example of a regulation that 
arguably evidences an unjust enrichment rationale, even though it is incorporated into 
                                                 
85
  Bruce Springsteen v Jeff Burgar and Bruce Springsteen Club, WIPO Case No. D2000-1532, Jan. 
25, 2001, ¶6 (available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-1532.html) (“It 
appears to be an established principle from cases such as Jeanette Winterson, Julia Roberts, and Sade that 
in the case of very well known celebrities, their names can acquire a distinctive secondary meaning giving 
rise to rights equating to unregistered trade marks, notwithstanding the non-registerability of the name 
itself. It should be noted that no evidence has been given of the name "Bruce Springsteen" having acquired 
a secondary meaning; in other words a recognition that the name should be associated with activities 
beyond the primary activities of Mr. Springsteen as a composer, performer and recorder of popular music. 
In the view of this Panel, it is by no means clear from the UDRP that it was intended to protect proper 
names of this nature. As it is possible to decide the case on other grounds, however, the Panel will proceed 
on the assumption that the name Bruce Springsteen is protected under the policy; it then follows that the 
domain name at issue is identical to that name.”) 
86
  UDRP, paras 4(b) and (c). 
87
  William J Clinton v Web of Deception, Claim Number: FA0904001256123, National Arbitration 
Forum, full text available at http://domains.adrforum.com/domains/decisions/1256123.htm , last viewed on 
August 10, 2009. 
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trademark legislation.88  The provision does not require a complainant to establish a 
trademark in her name in order to bring an action against a cybersquatter.  The provision 
is limited in operation in that the cybersquatter must have a clear sale motive.  Thus, the 
operation of a clickfarm under another person’s name will not run afoul of its terms.  This 
provision would thus be irrelevant to Scenario 3 in Table 2 for example.  This scenario 
involves an unauthorized fan website including a commercial clickfarm.  However, the 
provision would likely apply to Scenario 2.  This scenario is more of a straightforward 
cybersquatting case.   
 
These results on personal name disputes are unsatisfying and piecemeal.  Some 
commercial activities are proscribed by legislation while others are not.  The sui generis 
ACPA provision is also limited because it is stand-alone legislation in the United States 
with no analogs in other jurisdictions.  Unless a complainant can establish a nexus with 
the United States, and can assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the provision will 
be useless.  In any event, the costs of litigation may be prohibitive for many personal 
name complainants. 
 
The use of an unjust enrichment rationale to support the development of more 
accessible personal domain name regulations may be useful for future practice in the 
domain space.  This approach would support the drafting of simple dispute resolution 
procedures like the UDRP, but more broadly based on preventing unjust commercial 
profits relating to the use of another person’s name in the domain space.89  A 
restitutionary approach still leaves ample room to protect purely expressive uses of 
personal names.  In other words, the conduct of the registrants in Scenarios 1 and 4 in 
Table 2 would likely be protected as they relate predominantly to speech and do not 
implicate commerce.  Scenario 3 is more problematic – the unauthorized fan website that 
contains a clickfarm – because it combines commercial profits with expression.  
Nevertheless, a restitutionary policy rationale for regulation would assist in developing 
the appropriate contours for dealing with these kinds of situations in practice. 
 
2. Culturally and Geographically Significant Words and Phrases 
 
The regulatory matrix is more complex in the area of culturally and 
geographically significant words and phrases such as ubuntu, ularu, and amazon.  These 
kinds of words only attain trademark status if they have sufficient secondary meaning in 
association with the offering of goods or services.90  It is important for these terms to be 
available for legitimate expressive uses in the domain space.91  For example, traders from 
a particular region will often want to use a geographic term to indicate the geographical 
source of the goods, as opposed to the manufacturing source.92  Any regulation that 
                                                 
88
  15 U.S.C. § 1129(1)(A). 
89
  See, for example, Lipton, Celebrity in Cyberspace, supra note ___, at 1512-1526 (crafting a new 
personal domain name dispute resolution policy along similar lines). 
90
  LINDSAY, supra note ___, at 225. 
91
  id, at 225-226. 
92
  id, at 225 (“The inclusion of a geographical term in a registered trade mark always gives rise to 
particular difficulties.  The difficulties arise because, although it may be desirable to use a geographical 
term to indicate the source of goods or services, registration would prevent the legitimate use of the 
geographical term in a descriptive sense by other traders.”) 
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inhibits the use of a geographical or cultural term in the domain space must take into 
account the delicate balance of uses to which such a term may be put in practice.  The 
lack of a principled theoretical basis for domain name regulation has hindered the 
development of effective regulations in the context of cultural and geographic 
indicators.93  Consider the hypothetical scenarios in Table 3. 
 
Table 3:  Hypothetical Scenarios Involving Cultural and Geographic Indicators in 
the Domain Space 
 
 
Scenario 1.  A popular online bookstore registers a domain name that corresponds 
with the name of a famous landmark.  A group of manufacturers located near the 
landmark that uses its name in marketing their products and services wish to use the 
name in the domain space.94 
 
Scenario 2.  The official tourist bureau for a popular skiing region utilizes the 
name of the region in its domain name.  A trademark holder with registered trademark 
interests in the relevant term seeks transfer of the domain name.95 
 
Scenario 3.  A domain name speculator registers a group of domain names 
corresponding with well-known geographical terms in the hopes of making money from 
clickfarms on associated websites.  Her aim is to target Internet users who might be 
seeking information about the geographic locations.  The click-through advertisements 
are not specifically associated with any of the geographic locations. 
 
Scenario 4.  The President of the United States happens to have a last name that 
corresponds with the name of a city in Japan.  The “.com” domain name relating to the 
name is registered to the city offices for the Japanese city.  The President wants to use the 
name for his new online open government initiative. 
 
 
As was the case with the personal name scenarios in Table 2, the available 
domain name regulations focus on trademark policy.  A complainant who cannot 
establish a trademark in a geographic or cultural term will have little meaningful recourse 
against a registrant.  In some cases, the registrant itself may hold a valid trademark in the 
name – such as the amazon.com domain name in Scenario 1 in Table 3.  Thus, the 
regulations would protect that registrant against challenges from those with other 
interests in the domain name.96  It is an open question whether this is an appropriate result 
                                                 
93
  id, at 224-225 (noting that the World Intellectual Property Organization has, to date, declined to 
develop specific protections for geographical terms because of the lack of clear international principles on 
which such protections might be based). 
94
  id, at 229 (describing the example of the amazon.com trademark). 
95
  This hypothetical is loosely based on:  Kur- und Verkehrsverein St Moritz v StMoritz.com, WIPO 
Case No D2000-0617 (17 August, 2000). 
96
  For a more detailed discussion of the issue of multiple competing interests in a domain name, see 
discussion in Jacqueline Lipton, A Winning Solution for YouTube and Utube?  Corresponding Trademarks 
and Domain Name Sharing, 21 HARVARD JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY 509 (2008) [hereinafter, 
YouTube and Utube] 
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as a matter of policy.  In other words, the regulatory approach has been taken by default 
that trademark rights take precedence over other legitimate interests.97  Questions relating 
to the balance of competing legitimate interests in the domain space are beyond the scope 
of this discussion, although the author has addressed them elsewhere.98  The focus of this 
article is on creating a more coherent theoretical framework to regulate unfair or unjust 
conduct in the domain space. 
 
Existing regulations generally protect purely expressive uses of a domain name as 
legitimate uses, even against trademark holders.  Thus, the trademark holder in Scenario 
2 will likely be out of luck provided that the tourist bureau is using the name for 
expressive, rather than commercial, purposes.99  The lines between expressive and 
commercial uses may become blurred if the registrant has a dual purpose in registering 
the name.  Not all commercial purposes are in bad faith, although courts and arbitrators 
may be more protective of purely expressive uses than of other uses.  While a number of 
adjudicators have been sympathetic to those with expressive purposes, it is worth 
pointing out that free speech is not expressly identified as a legitimate use in either the 
ACPA or the UDRP.100  It is not impossible that a registrant whose primary motivation is 
expressive could be found to be acting in bad faith. 
 
Scenarios 3 and 4 in Table 3 raise complex issues that are not particularly well 
dealt with under current regulations.  While some of the domain names in Scenario 3 may 
correspond with trademarks, they are also general terms that might attract Internet users 
to the registrant’s clickfarm irrespective of any association with a particular mark.  While 
it is possible that the registrant had a sale motive in the back of her mind when she 
registered the names, it is not clear that her actions are in bad faith in the traditional 
cybersquatting sense.  The registration of multiple domain names corresponding with 
other people’s trademarks is an express bad faith factor under both the ACPA and the 
UDRP.101  However, the registration of domain names corresponding with cultural and 
geographic terms that may correspond in some cases with trademarks is not the same as 
the intentional registration of trademarks in the domain space.  The motivations for the 
conduct are different.  Unlike traditional cybersquatting, the former scenario relies on 
happenstance.  If it happens that a domain name relates to someone’s trademark, the 
registrant might serendipitously profit from clickfarm custom by Internet users seeking 
the trademark holder’s official website.   
 
The trademark-focused provisions of the UDRP and other domain name 
regulations are confusing in application in situations like Scenario 3.  As the policy 
                                                 
97
  Lipton, Beyond Cybersquatting, supra note ___, at 1363 (“current dispute resolution mechanisms 
are focused on the protection of commercial trademark interests, often to the detriment of other socially 
important interests that may inhere in a given domain name.”) 
98
  See discussion in Lipton, YouTube and Utube, supra note ___; Lipton, Commerce versus 
Commentary, supra note ___. 
99
  See Kur- und Verkehrsverein St Moritz v StMoritz.com, WIPO Case No D2000-0617 (17 August, 
2000). 
100
  In October, of 2006, however, under the Trademark Dilution Revision Act, criticism and 
commentary has been inserted into the Lanham Act as a defense for trademark dilution: 15 U.S.C. § 
1125(c)(3)(A)(ii). 
101
  15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(VIII); UDRP, para 4(b)(ii). 
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underpinnings for the regulations lie in trademark protection, there is no guidance to 
arbitrators and judges as to the correct approach to disputes involving these kinds of 
names.  Presumably, in many situations like Scenario 3, arbitrators and judges will find 
the registrant’s use of relevant terms to be legitimate.  If there was no motive to profit 
from someone else’s trademark, the application of rules based largely on trademark 
policy are not very helpful.  This is evidenced in Row 3 of Table 1, supra, suggesting that 
most uses of cultural and geographic words that are not trademarked are legitimate.   
 
Current trademark-focused policy has nothing to say about whether this is in fact 
the right result in the domain space as a matter of more general theory.  It is not clear 
whether we need specific regulations to protect cultural and geographic indicators that are 
not trademarked.  If so, such regulations might usefully be based on unjust enrichment.  
Irrespective of trademark interests, it may be worthwhile to develop rules that prevent, 
say, clickfarmers from making commercial profits that capitalize on words and phrases 
that have particular significance to one or more cultural groups, even if that significance 
is not manifested in a trademark or other property right.  In some cases, the words and 
phrases may have a proprietary connection with a particular cultural group, but more 
likely than not, an unjust enrichment rationale will be the best fit.  Under this rationale, it 
would be possible to develop rules based on the notion that a registrant should not be 
unjustly enriched at the expense of a group of people with a legitimate interest in a 
particular word or phrase. 
 
Scenario 4 in Table 3 is another problematic situation.  It does not involve any 
trademarks at all, unless the Japanese city officials have trademarked the city’s name or 
the President has established sufficient secondary meaning in his name to support a 
trademark.102  In the absence of trademark rights, current regulations give little guidance 
as to who has a better right to the domain name.  It is an open question whether any set of 
rules should be developed for rare scenarios like this.  It may be preferable to deal with 
them on a case by case basis.  In any event, the adoption of a theoretical basis for domain 
name regulation based on unjust enrichment may be helpful in delineating the kinds of 
conduct that should not be regulated at all.  A regulatory approach premised on unjust 
enrichment at the expense of another would militate against regulating situations like 
Scenario 4 in Table 3.  The adoption of a clear theoretical basis for domain name 
regulation that is broader than mere trademark policy may better delineate which 
situations require regulation and which simply involve a balance of competing legitimate 
interests in the domain space.  Scenario 4 is likely an example of the latter. 
                                                 
102
  High-level politicians have had some success in establishing trademarks in their personal names:  
William J Clinton v Web of Deception, Claim Number: FA0904001256123, National Arbitration Forum, 
full text available at http://domains.adrforum.com/domains/decisions/1256123.htm , last viewed on August 
10, 2009 (“Reluctantly, the Panelist concludes that President Clinton has established a common law mark 
in his name.  A mark is a secondary identifier of the source of goods and services.  President Clinton’s best-
selling books are probably enough to qualify his personal name as a common law mark.”); Hillary Rodham 
Clinton v Michele Dinoia, National Arbitration Forum Claim No FA0502000414641, March 18, 2005 (full 
text available at http://www.arb-forum.com/domains/decisions/414641.htm) (“The Panel finds that 
Complainant’s uncontested allegations establish common law rights in the HILLARY CLINTON mark 
sufficient to grant standing under the UDRP.  Complainant alleges that the HILLARY CLINTON mark has 
become distinctive through Complainant’s use and exposure of the mark in the marketplace and through 
use of the mark in connection with Complainant’s political activities, including a successful Senate 
campaign.”) 
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3. Generic Terms 
 
Generic terms raise another set of regulatory and policy issues to those discussed 
above.  Generic terms are broader than other classes of words and phrases in the domain 
space.  They include words like love, joy, business, and hope, not to mention sex, the 
subject of one of the most intriguing domain name battles fought outside the bounds of 
trademark law.103  More recently, P2P.com has been the subject of controversy in the 
domain space.104  Generic terms are generally neither trademarked nor trademarkable, 
subject to some relatively rare exceptions.105  Nevertheless, they are often valuable cyber-
realty.  A survey of the top twenty-five reported domain name sales at the end of 2007 
illustrates that generic terms generally raised the largest sales revenues of any domain 
names.
106
  “Porn.com” raised almost ten million dollars, while “business.com” and 
“diamond.com” tied at seven and a half million apiece.107  Even names like “fish.com” 
raised just over a million dollars, while “if.com” and “rock.com” tied at a million.108 
 
Again, current trademark-focused rules are a poor fit for conflicts that arise in 
relation to generic domain names.  A registrant of multiple generic terms in the domain 
space may have a variety of commercial and expressive motives, none of which likely 
have anything to do with interfering with a trademark holder’s rights.  There is a healthy 
and active market in generic domain names that has developed outside the realm of 
existing trademark-focused regulations.109  This raises a number of issues for regulators, 
including the foundational question as to whether there is ever a valid theoretical 
justification for regulating generic domain names.  The answer to this question depends 
on how much of a free market approach one is prepared to take with respect to the 
domain space. 
 
To the extent that regulations have been found wanting in the context of generic 
terms, the underlying theoretical quandary has related to the categorization of generic 
names as intangible property.  In other words a property rights rationale for domain name 
regulation potentially comes into play here.  For example, the “sex.com” domain name 
was the subject of a conversion action under Californian tort law.110  This dispute arose in 
circumstances where the name was, in effect, converted for the purposes of the 
                                                 
103
  Kremen v Cohen, 337 F 3d 1024 (9th Cir 2003) (finding domain name to be property for the 
purposes of the Californian statutory tort of conversion). 
104
  Purva Patel, Not Masters of Their (Web) Domains After All:  Stolen Internet Names Difficult to 
Track, Houston Chronicle, August 5, 2009, available at 
http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/tech/news/6560302.html, last viewed on August 10, 2009 (involving 
“p2p.com” domain name). 
105
  LINDSAY, supra note ___, at 352 (“A generic term is a name of a product or service itself.  Given 
that, by definition, a generic term cannot operate to distinguish the source of goods or services, it might be 
thought that anyone should be free to register a generic term as a domain name.  What is generic in one part 
of the world may, however, be distinctive in another part of the world.  Moreover, a term that is descriptive 
rather than generic may become distinctive and acquire trade mark rights.”) 
106
  KESMODEL, supra note ___, at 193. 
107
  id. 
108
  id. 
109
  id, at 24, 30. 
110
  Kremen v Cohen, 337 F 3d 1024 (9th Cir 2003). 
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Californian statute by a fraudulent request to the registering authority to transfer the name 
to a party who had no legal entitlement to the name.  A similar situation arose more 
recently in the case of the “P2P.com” domain name.  Registrants of generic names that 
are “stolen” in this way have very little guidance as to their rights.  The regulatory 
impulse to date has been to gravitate towards property theory and explain the conflict in 
terms of the misappropriation of another’s property.   
 
However, as noted in Part II.B, property analogies can be problematic in the 
domain space because they never apply perfectly to the virtual world.  The attraction of 
the property theory is that it fits the way people routinely think about domain names.  
Markets for trading in domain names have developed over the years, and people treat the 
domain names as proprietary assets.111  Despite the market approach, the judicial verdict 
has been less clear.  While some judges have accepted domain names as intangible 
property, others have not.112  This might be a good time in the development of domain 
name jurisprudence to make a clear decision one way or the other.  In other words, 
regulators could make a policy decision to accept domain names as a form of property, 
and thus accept a property rights rationale for their regulation.  This would include 
allowing more ready access to trespass and conversion actions in cases involving generic 
domain names.  Alternatively, regulators could make the opposite decision and deny 
domain names proprietary status.  Any subsequent regulations might then have to be 
based on an unjust enrichment rationale. 
 
This article suggests that the property model may be preferable for several 
reasons.  It best accords with the way market participants relate to domain names.  Even 
though a domain name is a form of contractual license from a registering authority to a 
registrant,113 it results in a valuable asset that is freely traded on the open market, and that 
is occasionally stolen by a bad faith actor.  Even though a transfer of a domain name is, in 
reality, a de-registration to the original registrant and re-registration to the new registrant, 
it is now treated routinely as a seamless transfer as if the name was being handed directly 
from the original registrant to the new registrant.  Further, the acceptance of a property 
rights rationale for regulating generic domain names could take advantage of existing 
property based laws such as theft and conversion and simply extend them judicially to 
virtual property.  An non-proprietary unjust enrichment rationale, on the other hand, 
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  id., at 1030 (“like other forms of property, domain names are valued, bought and sold, often for 
millions of dollars”). 
112
  Kremen v Cohen, 337 F 3d 1024 (9th Cir 2003) (accepting domain names as property for the 
purposes of Californian statutory conversion action); Network Solutions v Umbro International, 529 S.E. 
2d 9- (Va. 2000) (court not prepared to accept domain names as property for the purposes of a garnishment 
action); Purva Patel, Not Masters of Their (Web) Domains After All:  Stolen Internet Names Difficult to 
Track, Houston Chronicle, August 5, 2009, available at 
http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/tech/news/6560302.html, last viewed on August 10, 2009 (“domain 
names aren't physical property, but a right to contract … because owners pay for the right to use the name”, 
citing Mr Jeff Becker, an intellectual property attorney from Dallas). 
113
  Purva Patel, Not Masters of Their (Web) Domains After All:  Stolen Internet Names Difficult to 
Track, Houston Chronicle, August 5, 2009, available at 
http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/tech/news/6560302.html, last viewed on August 10, 2009 (“domain 
names aren't physical property, but a right to contract … because owners pay for the right to use the name”, 
citing Mr Jeff Becker, an intellectual property attorney from Dallas). 
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would necessitate going back to the drawing board in terms of drafting appropriate 
regulations. 
 
4. Typosquatting 
 
Typosquatting has been defined as:  “taking advantage of common misspellings 
made by Internet users who are looking for a particular site of a particular provider of 
goods or services, in order to obtain some benefit therefrom.”114  This definition covers 
typosquatting in relation to trademarks, but theoretically one could just as easily squat on 
other words and phrases.  One might register common misspellings of generic words, 
personal names, and cultural or geographic indictors in the hope of attracting Internet 
custom.  For example, a domain name speculator who could not afford to bargain for 
“porn.com”115 might just as easily register “pron.com” in the hope of attracting 
customers.116  Such conduct is unlikely to amount to bad faith or to be regulated in any 
way under existing domain name rules because it does not implicate any trademark 
interests.  The most common forms of typosquatting involve trademarks and, to some 
extent, personal names.117   
 
Typosquatting that involves misspelling of a trademark is currently regulated by 
the ACPA and the UDRP.  Each of these rules covers situations where the domain name 
is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark.118  However, where a domain name 
corresponds with a person’s name, the complainant will be out of luck unless she can 
establish a trademark in her name.  The sui generis prohibitions on personal name 
cybersquatting in the Lanham act do not cover registrations of domain names that are 
confusingly similar to a person’s name.119  They only cover registration of the person’s 
actual name in the domain space.  Misspellings of generic, cultural, and geographic terms 
that do not correspond with trademarks do not currently raise the specter of regulation.  
There is perhaps no reason why they should, but again it is a question that has not 
received any meaningful regulatory attention. 
 
Typosquatting, particularly with respect to trademarks and some personal names, 
should be an easy issue in the regulatory context.  The fact that someone has gone to the 
trouble of registering a deliberate misspelling of someone else’s mark or name suggests a 
bad faith motive in and of itself.  It may therefore raise an initial presumption of bad faith 
commercial conduct that should be regulated as a matter of policy.  The question then 
arises as to the basis on which such conduct should be regulated as a policy matter.  
Typosquatting, at least as it relates to trademarks, can be, and currently is, regulated 
under the trademark policy rationale.   
 
Under this approach, commercially profitable uses of a misspelling of another’s 
mark in the domain space attract sanctions, while purely expressive uses do not.  We 
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  LINDSAY, supra note ___, at 259, citing Shields v Zuccarini, 254 F 3d 476, 483 (3d Cir, 2001). 
115
  The actual “porn.com” domain name most recently sold for USD$9,500,000:  KESMODEL, supra 
note ___, at 193. 
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  At the time of writing, the domain name “pron.com” was in fact registered for this purpose. 
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  See Table 1, supra, rows 5 and 6. 
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  15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii)(I) & (II); UDRP, para 4(a)(i). 
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  15 U.S.C. § 1129(1)(A). 
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might therefore expect the regulation of typosquatting on trademarks to mirror the 
regulation of “sucks”-type domain names relating to trademarks.  While speech should be 
protected, unfair commercial advantage-taking should not.  A brief look back at Table 1 
suggests that there are potentially some differences in the application of current 
regulations to typosquatting as compared with “sucks”-type domain names.  It appears 
that typosquatting more readily attracts sanctions than the registration of “sucks”-type 
domain names.  This is unsurprising given that the deliberate misspelling of a mark is 
more likely to be undertaken for a commercial purpose than the registration of a “sucks”-
type domain name.  The latter tend more often to be used for commentary and criticism 
while the former tend to be used more for unfair commercial advantage.   
 
Over time, savvy domain name speculators have come to use “sucks”-type 
domains for commercial purposes, hiding behind the pejorative term to clothe their 
conduct in the guise of speech.  As observed by David Lindsay, the use of “sucks”-type 
domain names in this way has come to be termed “sham speech”.120  While still amenable 
to regulation under a trademark policy rationale, arbitrators and judges approaching sham 
speech websites must be careful to apply the trademark-protecting laws as robustly as 
they would in the case of typosquatting. 
 
This discussion has not yet touched on typosquatting on personal names.  Many 
personal names are commercially valuable in spite of the potential lack of trademark 
protection.  This is one reason why Congress adopted specific anti-cybersquatting rules 
relating to personal names.121  In the case of typosquatting on a non-trademarked personal 
name, a trademark policy rationale cannot be the basis for regulation.  Presumably, a 
property rights rationale is likewise not a particularly good fit in the absence of clearly 
accepted property rights in personal names.122  So again, the only viable theoretical 
justification here would be unjust enrichment.  Drawing on unjust enrichment theory, one 
could develop accessible rules for individuals aggrieved by typosquatting on their names 
in the domain space for unfair commercial profit motives.  This would be similar to the 
approach that could be taken to better streamline regulations relating to the use of 
personal names in the domain space more generally.123 
 
IV. THE ROLE OF THE REGISTRY 
 
One piece of the puzzle missing from the preceding discussion relates to the role 
of domain name registries.  A significant advantage of creating a clearer theoretical basis 
for domain name regulation would, in fact, be increased clarity as to the role and 
potential liability of domain name registries in domain name disputes.  Existing law and 
policy has been unclear about the extent to which a domain name registry should ever be 
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  LINDSAY, supra note ___, at 262. 
121
  15 U.S.C. §1129(1)(A). 
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  Mark McKenna, The Right of Publicity and Autonomous Self-Definition, 67 U PITT L REV 225, 
247 (2005) (“It might be true that identity is sufficiently similar to other objects the law regards as property 
and therefore deserves at least some of the sticks in the traditional bundle of property rights. But far too few 
courts and commentators have offered a theory as to why any of the traditional property justifications lead 
to that conclusion. Such approaches are reflective of the general imprecision that has plagued the right of 
publicity.”). 
123
  See discussion in Part III.B.1, supra. 
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liable for bad faith conduct by domain name registrants.  There are arguments both for 
and against the imposition of such liability.  In early trademark-focused cases, registries 
were routinely added as litigants in trademark infringement and dilution actions.124  This 
was an obvious strategy for plaintiffs.  The registry was often much easier to locate than 
the registrant.  The registry may also be less impecunious than the registrant.  The 
registry also maintained the necessary contact information about the registrant.  
Moreover, in early domain name cases, the registry was typically Network Solutions 
situated in Reston, Virginia.125  This made the assertion of jurisdiction under the Lanham 
Act an easy matter for potential plaintiffs.   
 
The registry was obviously complicit in the registration in that it had taken the 
registrant’s money and handed out a domain name that corresponded with the plaintiff’s 
mark.  Thus, it was fairly easy to argue at least contributory trademark infringement or 
dilution.  Because Network Solutions was not particularly well financed and was simply 
implementing what was initially thought to be a purely technical process, its officers were 
not trained to detect and prevent trademark infringement.126  It was possible to argue that 
once a registry had knowledge – in the form of a complaint by a trademark holder – that a 
domain name registration potentially infringed the mark, it should take action to cancel 
the registration.127  While this view has some merit, it potentially puts the registry in the 
role of having to adjudicate between two competing claims if the registrant itself has 
asserted a legitimate interest in the domain name.  Again, most domain name registries 
are ill-equipped to determine the appropriate outcome of disputes involving competing 
claims in a domain name.   
 
Other Internet intermediaries have faced analogous situations.  Many Internet 
service providers have been asked to remove material contributed by their users on the 
basis that it infringes a copyright,128 infringes a trademark,129 or is defamatory.130  
Internet intermediaries are often not in a position to ascertain the validity of these claims 
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  See, for example, Lockheed Martin Corp v Network Solutions Inc, 194 F 3d 980 (9th Cir 1999); 
Philip Zadeik, Domain Name Disputes:  The United States Experience, available at 
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against, say, a fair use defense asserted by an alleged copyright infringer.131  Ultimately, 
Congress has legislated in some of these areas in an attempt to clarify the responsibility 
of the intermediaries.  Thus, § 230 of the Communications Decency Act provides a safe 
harbor for Internet intermediaries for liability for the speech of others.132  This applies 
significantly in the defamation context to prevent a chilling affect on Internet speech that 
might result if the gateway services enabling online speech faced legal liability for the 
speech of others.133  In the copyright context, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act also 
provides a safe harbor from copyright infringement for Internet service providers that 
have acted expeditiously in removing infringing material on receipt of a notice by the 
copyright holder.134 
 
The role of domain name registrars in terms of their liability for the conduct of 
their users has been variously dealt with in the context of domain name regulation.  Much 
of the rule-making here is contractual.  Since being joined as defendants in early 
trademark cases, domain name registries quickly inserted into their registration policies 
clauses that disclaimed liability for trademark infringement.  These clauses squarely 
placed the onus on registrants to ensure that they were not infringing other people’s 
trademark rights or other legal interests.135  The UDRP is a significant part of this 
contractual approach.  It contractually binds registrants to submit to mandatory 
arbitrations if a trademark owner complains about the registration of the registrant’s 
domain name.136  Under the UDRP, the registry represents that it will abide by decisions 
of arbitrators and domestic courts on matters relating to rights in domain names.137  These 
contractual measures take much of the early pressure off domain name registries by 
making it clear that they do not – and cannot be expected to – take initial responsibility 
for bad faith registrations in breach of trademark policy.  However, they do not go much 
beyond trademark policy.  
 
While UDRP arbitrators may squeeze disputes involving domain names of 
unclear trademark status within their jurisdiction, the expressed justification must always 
be finding a trademark interest in a word or phrase in the domain space.  In other words, a 
UDRP arbitrator, seeking to be sympathetic to the holder of an interest in a personal 
name or geographic term, might order the transfer a domain name corresponding to such 
a term to the complainant.  However, in these cases the arbitrator must find a trademark 
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right in that name or term on which to base the transfer order.  There is simply no action 
available under the UDRP without a trademark.138 
 
This fact may have caused some arbitrators to readily accept trademarks in words 
that have not unequivocally achieved this status.139  The fact that the UDRP is the most 
accessible avenue of recourse for domain name complainants might motivate some 
arbitrators too readily to find trademarks in personal names, and cultural and geographic 
indicators.  This in itself may be a sufficient argument for identifying and developing 
theoretical justifications for domain name regulation outside of trademark policy.   
 
At this point in time, the adoption of regulations that are accessible to disputants, 
but that encompass broader policy aims, such as the prevention of unjust enrichment 
more generally, may be a useful development that will lead to more coherent regulations 
in the future.  Such an approach may be instructive not only for domain name disputes 
per se, but also for disputes involving Internet search engines more generally.  Also, the 
forthcoming extension of the domain space to incorporate new gTLDs would benefit 
from a clearer understanding of the kinds of policies that should be reflected in the 
resolution of disputes involving domain names.140 
 
The adoption of a broader and more coherent theoretical framework for domain 
name disputes would bring with it a need to clarify the extent to which domain name 
registries might be held liable for infringements of protected interests in domain names.  
In the trademark policy arena, a decision has already been made that registries are not 
generally required to take initial responsibility for the registration of trademarked terms, 
but are required to abide by remedies granted by arbitrators and courts.141  As a cost-
benefits exercise, this makes sense, particularly given the easily accessible mechanism 
now available for trademark holders to protect their interests under the UDRP. 
 
The question remains as to whether there are other areas of domain name policy 
that may require a different balance of interests in terms of the potential liability of 
registrars for conduct of registrants.  The obvious example is the relatively rare situation 
involving conversion or theft of domain names, secured by a wrongdoer fraudulently 
approaching a registrar for transfer of a name originally registered to someone else.  
These situations raise a different cost-benefits analysis to the trademark policy issues 
addressed by the UDRP.  In the case of fraudulent conversions of domain names 
involving generic terms the domain name registry is implicated in a different way to the 
way in which it is typically involved in a trademark-focused dispute.  In the latter 
situation, the registry is simply performing its typical functions of processing often large 
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volumes of applications for currently unregistered domain names.  In contrast, the former 
situation involves a request to transfer a domain name from an existing registrant into the 
hands of a new registrant.  In these cases, it is reasonable to expect the registry to be at 
least a little bit vigilant to ensure that the original registrant has indeed acquiesced to the 
transfer.  In the case of any doubt, it is not difficult for the registrant to send an email to 
the original registrant to verify the transfer. 
 
The Ninth Circuit court took this view in the “sex.com” case.  Holding Network 
Solutions – the registry – liable for conversion under the Californian statute, the court 
noted that Network Solutions had made no effort to contact the original registrant of the 
domain name before giving the name away on the basis of a facially suspect letter from a 
third party who had subsequently left the jurisdiction.142  While accepting that the third 
party (Cohen) was the guilty party in the case, the court felt that there was nothing 
inappropriate about holding Network Solutions responsible for giving away the domain 
name when it could have taken simple precautions to ensure that the transfer request was 
not fraudulent.143  With respect to the argument accepted in the District Court about the 
policy problems inherent in imposing liability on domain name registries, the Ninth 
Circuit noted: 
 
“The district court was worried that “the threat of litigation threatens 
to stifle the registration system by requiring further regulations by 
[Network Solutions] and potential increases in fees.” …. Given that 
Network Solutions’s “regulations” evidently allowed it to hand over a 
registrant’s domain name on the basis of a facially suspect letter 
without even contacting him, “further regulations” don’t seem like 
such a bad idea.  And the prospect of higher fees presents no issue here 
that it doesn’t in any other context.  A bank could lower ATM fees if it 
didn’t have to pay security guards, but we doubt that most depositors 
would think that was a good idea.”144 
 
In fraudulent transfer situations there is a good argument for imposing liability on 
a domain name registry if the registry has not taken inexpensive and simple precautions 
to ensure the validity of a transfer request.  The question remains as to what is the 
appropriate policy justification for the imposition of such liability.  While the Ninth 
Circuit was prepared to rely on the property rights rationale underpinning the Californian 
conversion statute,145 its holding is specific to its interpretation of that statute.  A more 
widely accepted property rights rationale for these kinds of cases might lead to judicial 
interpretations of existing legislation in other states that would more readily accept 
property rights in generic domain names in support of these kinds of holdings.  At the 
present time, a property rights approach to domain name disputes is not generally 
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accepted and some situations involving alleged conversion of others’ generic domain 
names have proved difficult to resolve as a matter of law.146   
 
Alternatively, an unjust enrichment rationale would be a theoretical possibility for 
remedying fraudulent transfer situations.  Where a fraudulent transferee is unjustly 
enriched at the expense of the original registrant, the domain name registry might be held 
liable for facilitating the unjust enrichment.  Unlike the property rights approach, the 
unjust enrichment rationale probably calls for new regulations that are less focused on 
property than current conversion laws, and that more squarely deal with unjust 
enrichments outside of property rights.  It may ultimately be possible to develop a new 
kind of UDRP that is more squarely based on the unjust enrichment concept and is not 
limited to trademark policy.  This would effectively allow a cost-effective and accessible 
avenue of recourse for complainants and might also side-step the question of registry 
liability, because registries would presumably continue to be bound by private arbitral 
decisions involving domain names.  Perhaps the system could work towards a general 
unjust enrichment model to capture unjust commercial conduct in the domain space 
involving any kind of word or phrase.  In the meantime, registrants faced with fraudulent 
transfer situations may have to rely on a property rights rationale and pursue actions 
under existing theft and conversion laws. 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The domain name system currently suffers from a lack of cohesive and coherent 
underlying theory.  This is partly the result of a lack of focus on domain name issues 
outside trademark-oriented disputes.  Importantly, there is no single entity that has global 
constitutional competence to create an overarching policy for domain name regulation.  
Nevertheless, the gaps and inconsistencies in current regulations are causing problems of 
application in practice.  The domain name system requires the identification of an 
underlying theoretical framework that would support more workable and coherent 
regulations.   In particular, trademark policy – although useful to counteract traditional 
cybersquatting – has significant limitations when applied to more general practices in 
global domain name markets. 
 
An examination of existing domain name regulations, coupled with approaches by 
courts and arbitrators in applying them to novel situations, suggests the development of 
an underlying model that might draw from three distinct theoretical bases:  trademark 
policy, restitution, and property theory.  Developing a framework that draws on the 
synergies between these three areas theoretical bases would more effectively facilitate 
future developments in domain name regulation and practice that better address the needs 
of modern domain name markets. 
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Clearly, this article is a preliminary foray into largely unexplored territory.  As 
such, it is somewhat tentative and general in its conclusions.  Importantly, as 
acknowledged above,147 there are three pressing, and often overlapping, challenges facing 
today’s domain name regulation system, and this article focuses predominantly on only 
one of them.  The challenges are to: (a) develop an appropriate theoretical framework for 
future regulation; (b) identify an entity, or set of entities, with sufficient constitutional 
competence to implement regulations based on that framework; and, (c) ensure that any 
regulations can be meaningfully enforced by private individuals or other institutions with 
sufficient standing or power to enforce them.  These are all significant challenges that 
have so far received little attention in existing scholarship.  Hopefully, this article will 
serve as a useful starting point for debates that cover all of these aspects of domain name 
governance, as well as the interplay between them. 
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